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Aristotle on Akratic Action: How Rational is It?
t
Patrick Mooney, John Carroll University (Cleveland, OH)
(SAGP with APA Central Division Meeting, May 8, 1998, Chicago, Illinois)
[N.B.: In order to devote more space to my argument, I have omitted all footnote material, though I 
retain the note numbers in the text. Persons interested may obtain the notes from me in Chicago, or upon 
request via (216) 397-4786, or, <pmooney@jcvaxa.jcu.edu>. Apologies for any frustration.]
§1. Introduction.
. My answer to the question asked in the paper’s title is: akratic action-acting 
contrary to what one believes or knows is the best course of action open to one, or 
“weakness of will”—is not rational at all, according to Aristotle (here restricting myself to 
his discussion of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics, VII. 1-3). In saying that it is ‘not 
rational at all,’ I have in mind that there is no “intellectual,” or “cognitive,” faculty at work 
which so much as helps to bring about the akratic act-there is, in other words, no way in 
which the akrates “figures out” how to perform the akratic act.
For those readers who believe that Aristotle’s account of akrasia involves two 
warring “practical syllogisms” (a view to be discussed shortly), my claim should come as a 
bit of a surprise, because what I will call the “two-syllogisms” interpretation of Aristotle is 
incompatible with it. According to the two-syllogisms view, Aristotelian akratic action is at 
least somewhat rational. Thus, for example, I disagree with the great Burnet, who 
maintains that it is “Aristotle’s great contribution to moral psychology” that there is an 
intellectual element involved in vice and weakness.1 On my view, Aristotle does not 
believe that there is an intellectual element involved in weakness.
Other readers will find a certain aspect of the argument for my view a little 
surprising. Since Aristotle partly intended for his account of akrasia to refute Socrates’ 
rejection of akrasia (as I shall argue in Section 2), since the two- syllogisms account would 
surely not have refuted Socrates or the Socratic (as I shall argue in Sections 3 and 4), and 
if we allow the amount of interpretive charity appropriate for one as great as Aristotle--so 
that we allow that Aristotle would see that such an account (if indeed such an account had 
occurred to him to give) would not refute Socrates or the Socratic—then we have good 
reason to suppose that Aristotle did not give a two syllogisms account of akrasia. This 
argument will surprise because it suggests that Aristotle, unlike most of us modems, 
takes Socrates’ rejection of akrasia seriously enough to use it as a philosophical foil in 
discussing his own views. In fact, as I will point out below, Aristotle uses Socrates’ 
position as something of a “test” for the soundness of certain “common beliefs” about 
akrasia that he wishes to defend. Aristotle’s attitude towards Socrates’ rejection of akrasia 
is thus not as enthusiastically négative as modem ones tend to be, and this insight- 
provides for us an important interpretive constraint upon our reading of his own positive 
account of akrasia, viz., that it should turn out to be philosophically apposite to the 
Socratic, and not necessarily to the non-Socratic. (Are we to suppose that there were no 
Socratics about akrasia, or, at least, Socratic-leaners, in Aristotle’s student audience?2) So, 
in order to see how a crucial portion of Aristotle’s account of akrasia is supposed to work, 
we will need to take some Socratic presumptions with us to the text. This, indeed, is an 
unusual approach to take in examining issues regarding akrasia in general, as well as an 
unusual approach in examining Aristotle’s discussion in particular.
In fact, the vast portion of my paper will be devotedtosettingout-this Arietotelian- 
Socratic exchange on akrasia that I believe lies just below the surface of Aristotle’s
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discussion in the Ethics, and that has gone mostly unnoticed and unexploited in the 
previous scholarship on Aristotle’s account of akrasia. (Considerations of space will have 
me single-mindedly arguing for that point, to the exclusion of including a discussion of 
what I believe is Aristotle’s real account of akrasia.) A posthumous dialogue—so to speak- 
-between Socrates and Aristotle on this topic is rich in resources, I think: If my reason is a 
good one for finding dubious what I have called a “two-syllogisms” interpretation of 
Aristotelian akrasia, then some strengths of the Socratic psychology of action are revealed 
that otherwise remain mostly hidden. Some of these strengths are unlocked upon a more 
careful reading of one of Socrates’ near contemporaries—someone, notably, who has 
found plenty more favor among modem philosophers than has Socrates.3
Since so much of what I have to say about Aristotle’s account of akrasia depends 
upon my view that he uses Socrates’ rejection of akrasia as a test for the correctness of 
common beliefs about akrasia that he wishes to defend, I begin by arguing for this claim.
§2: How Aristotle Constructs His Own Discussion of Akrasia Around the Task of Giving 
an (Un-Socratic) Answer to Socrates and the Socratic.
There can be little question, I think, that Aristotle’s account of akrasia is, in 
considerable part, constructed as a response to Socrates’ infamous denial of the possibility 
of akrasia. This can be seen, to begin with, by considering the method of approach that 
Aristotle announces he will follow in examining akrasia (1145b3-7), and, secondly, by 
considering how his approach imposes upon him the task of having to philosophically 
confront Socrates’ rejection of akrasia.
Here is Aristotle’s announced method of approach (I shall rely heavily upon the 
Irwin translation of the Ethics, with my very few departures discussed in the notes):
As in  the other cases we must set out the appearances (τ à 
φαινόμενα), and first of all go through the puzzles. In this way we 
must prove the common beliefs (τά ένδοξα) about these ways of 
being affected—ideally, all the common beliefs, but if not all, then 
most of them, and the most important. For if  the objections are 
solved, and the common beliefs are left, it w ill be an adequate
proof.4
We must not simply accept the common beliefs about akrasia, I take Aristotle’s overall 
point to be, without first subjecting those beliefs to some critical examination. So he will 
first say what the common beliefs {ta phainomena or ta endoxaf are about akrasia before 
considering some difficulties, or objections, that they encounter; and then, if possible, he 
will try to show that all of the common beliefs about it are nevertheless true in spite of 
the difficulties. Should the common beliefs hold up under such scrutiny, this will be a 
sufficient argument on their behalf.
Per his method of approach, Aristotle then proceeds to list some common beliefs 
(1145b8-21). On account of space considerations, I here list only those that I believe are 
most relevant for my discussion. These are that.
The enkrates {the one who is “strong of will”} is the same as the one 
who abides by his rational calculation, and the akrates is the same 
as the one who {steps outside of}6 it,
and that,
The akrates knows that his actions are base, but does them because 
of his feelings, while the enkrates knows that his appetites are base, 
but because of reason does not follow them.
If Aristotle is to defend these beliefs (amongst others) against objections, then he may 
need to show how it is possible for a person to “step outside of” his or her rational
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calculation (presumably, a calculation about what’s best for the person to do right now-if 
not, then this cannot be a common belief about akrasia) and yet, because of his or her 
feelings, act contrary to what has been calculated.
But is knowledge a state against which one may act? A negative answer to this 
question seems to He in the offing, and we thus have the first difficulty raised against the 
common beliefs. If knowledge is strong, after all, then the common beliefs about akrasia- 
-at least those which maintain that knowledge is weak in such circumstances-must be 
incorrect.
Now Aristotle introduces the difficulty saying (1145b21-22): “We might be puzzled 
about the sort of correct supposition someone has when he acts akratically,” and, as will 
be seen, subsequently cites reasons against there being any such sort of correct 
supposition. But it is chiefly Aristotle’s concern with Socrates’ rejection of akrasia that 
leads to this difficulty, or aporia. Here is what Aristotle then immediately says about 
Socrates and his denial of akrasia (1145b22-27):
First of all some say {the akrates} cannot have knowledge [at the 
time he acts]. For it would be terrible, Socrates thought, for 
knowledge to be in someone, but mastered by something else, and 
b24 dragged around like a slave. For Socrates fought against the 
account [of akrasia] in general, in the belief that there is no 
b26 akrasia; for no one, he thought, supposes while he acts that his 
action conflicts with what is best; our action conflicts with what is 
best only because we are ignorant [of the conflict].
If Socrates is right, then, surely, the person cannot, per the first common belief that I 
have fisted, step outside of his or her rational calculation about what’s best, nor can he or 
she act on feeling rather than on knowledge, per the second common belief.
At b24 Aristotle evidently quotes from the Protagoras, noting Socrates’ denial there
that knowledge can be dragged around by pleasure like a slave. ^  But why does Socrates 
deny this? Aristotle answers this question in the following way (beginning at b26): 
because Socrates also thinks that the person believes that the action he is performing, as 
he performs it, is the best action to perform. In other words, Socrates’ view, according to 
Aristotle, is that, since no one acts against what he or she believes is best for him or her at 
the time of acting, and since knowledge is a species of belief, neither can one act against 
what one knows is best for him or her at the time of acting. Knowledge is strong because 
belief is strong. This account of Socrates’ view^ implies that, in discussing akrasia, we 
must be quite indifferent about what the sort of correct supposition is that is acted against; 
for purposes of getting clear about akrasia, according to Aristotle, knowledge is no better 
than true belief (1145b35-46a4; 46b25-31).9 So as Aristotle evidently sees things, the 
main issue of akrasia--at least as far as dealing with Socrates’ rejection of akrasia is 
concemed-is whether or not one can act against a strong conviction that one has abouti 
what’s best for one-never mind what sort of conviction this might happen to be. At the 
very' least, we might imagine Aristotle saying to himself, Socrates’ argument about the 
strength of knowledge captures this point, for (as Aristotle represents that view) it is 
based upon the notion that belief is strong.
It follows that if Socrates is right about knowledge, he’s just as right about true 
belief. It may be added that Socrates is then also just as right about phronesis, that 
intellectual virtue which Aristotle identifies with the ethically virtuous person since it, 
too, involves having correct beliefs about what is best to do in one’s present circumstance 
(1140b4-5,11-16).10
Knowledge, strongly held true belief and phronesis are the three sorts of correct
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supposition that Aristotle considers as candidates for being the sort that is acted against 
during akrasia; all three of them are found wanting; the first two are found wanting 
because of Socrates’ rejection of akrasia·, and the third may be added as wanting in this 
regard because of the way in which Aristotle explains Socrates’ argument against akrasia.
It seems, then, that Aristotle must have supposed that one good test for the 
viability of the common beliefs is whether or not they manage to stand up against 
Socrates’ view about the strength of knowledge (as Aristotle understands that view). 
Remember: The common beliefs are to be defended against various puzzles about them, 
and Socrates’ rejection of akrasia is evidently the source of the first puzzle. So even if 
Aristotle thinks Socrates is wrong about akrasia, he evidently does not think that Socrates 
is obviously wrong about it. (Why bother, after all, with defending the common beliefs 
against a difficulty inspired by a view that is obviously wrong?) From Aristotle’s point of 
view, Socrates’ view is something of a kingpin: at least some of the common beliefs stand 
or fall depending upon it, and Aristotle must have thought it one of his tasks in VII.2-3 of 
the Ethics to defend at least some of the common beliefs against Socrates’ denial of 
akrasia. If acting contrary to a strong conviction about what’s best is going to be at all 
possible, Socrates will need to be wrong about the strength of knowledge.
I shall now assume that sufficient ground has been given for saying that one of 
Aristotle’s main aims in the Ethics, VII.2-3, is to answer Socrates’ rejection of akrasia with 
some anti-Socratic account of akrasia. The importance of this line of reasoning, if it is 
correct, is that we will have thus established a very important interpretive constraint 
upon Aristotle’s own account of akrasia, namely, that,
Aristotle's own account of akrasia w ill need to somehow show, 
against the Soeratie position, how akrasia can occur in spite of the 
presence of knowledge (or some strongly held conviction) in the 
akrates.
I emphasize ‘against the Soeratie position’ in order to underscore the following 
point. If Aristotle’s subsequent positive account of akrasia does not somehow resolve the 
Soeratie aporia, then Aristotle will not (or, at least, will not necessarily) succeed in his 
announced aim. It stands to reason, then, that the Soeratie position on the matter should 
be consulted to see if, indeed, Aristotle has succeeded. Aristotle does not, after all, 
mention Socrates’ denial of akrasia merely in order to catalogue what has been said on 
the issue by those who have considered it before him -a common enough practice for 
Aristotle. Instead, as we have seen, he presents it as a difficulty that must somehow be 
overcome in order to defend the common beliefs. This means that Aristotle regarded 
Socrates’ position as a serious and plausible one-enough so, anyway, to merit a good deal 
of his attention in his own discussion.11 Hence, unlike many modem thinkers, Aristotle 
does not simply declare Socrates wrong12 and move on to consider other, “more 
challenging,” aporiai.
It seems to me, therefore, that if we subsequently find Aristotle’s own account 
unconvincing from a Soeratie point of view, then by the “principle” of interpretive charity 
we owe it to Aristotle to strongly reconsider our interpretation of him!
How, then, are we to interpret Aristotle in light of these considerations? To begin 
with, we may not approach Aristotle’s own account of akrasia armed with our modem 
assurance that Socrates is obviously wrong about akrasia, and hope to understand the 
account. If our own anti-Socratic confidence is not matched by Aristotle, how can we be so 
sure that we will know how to approach Aristotle’s own account of akrasia—that we will 
know “what to look for,” so to speak? We will do far better by Aristotle, I think, if we 
interpret him in a way that allows him the best chance of satisfying his announced aim of
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defending the common beliefs against objections, and we can do this only if we first give 
due consideration to what sort of account of akrasia would pose the greatest challenge to 
the Socratic. As will be seen, I believe that such an account must be dismissive of a “two- 
syllogisms” interpretation of Aristotle.
The best way to introduce the relevant passages on Aristotelian akrasia, why I 
believe that Aristotelian akratic action is not rational at all (and so why it in fact poses a 
greater philosophical challenge to Socrates than does a two-syllogisms interpretation) 
and how my view differs from that of many other scholars, is by briefly considering two 
well-known passages from Euripides’ Medea (1041-1066, and 1078-1080). I turn now to 
this task.
§3: Is Medea Akratic or Merely Indecisive? Why We Should he Skeptical About a Rather 
Common Construal o f Aristotle’s Account of Akrasia.
In considering the Medea passages, I shall assume without argument-though not 
without warrant--that Medea is egoistically motivated (i.e., she wants to do whatever is 
best for herself in her present circumstance), and that, for her, goodness is a matter of 
pleasure and the absence of pain (where pleasure and pain are broadly construed to 
include psychological well-being, or happiness, and ill-being, or misery).
Abandoned by her husband, Jason, Medea decides to exact revenge by murdering 
her own children by him. But when the time comes for her to act (the first passage), she 
reconsiders her plan. For she sees that by killing the children she will suffer twice as 
much pain as will Jason (1047). This is too high a price for revenge, and makes it 
anything but sweet. But by not killing them, she will be laughed at (1050). After all, she 
betrayed her own family to be with Jason (in fact she killed her own brother), only to 
now be betrayed by him in turn—a reversal of fortune that would surely be difficult to 
live with. But no one will be laughing at her if she gets away with making Jason pay 
dearly for his betrayal: his children must be killed. On the other hand, if she spares the 
children and simply brings them to Athens with her (as King Aegeus has promised her 
refuge), they will be a source of cheer to her (1058). What will bring her cheer once the 
children are gone? Perhaps it is best to spare them, instead. But then (or so I interpret 
this particular part of the passage) she realizes that the children have already helped her- 
-unwittingly-to carry out her plot to murder Jason’s new bride, and that they will be 
killed by her enemies before they can get away (1060-1). It is best that she kill the 
children: They shall die either way, and this way at least their murders may serve to exact 
revenge.13
There is so far little question that Medea’s state of mind is one of indecisiveness. 
She is, after all, unsure about which of her alternatives will yield the best result for 
herself. Can she live more happily (or less miserably) having killed her own children and 
making Jason suffer, or by sparing the children and letting Jason get away with his 
betraying her? She tries to resolve the matter by turning the alternatives over in her 
mind to get a glimpse of the various pluses and minuses that accompany each, but, 
changing her mind four times, it is evidently a difficult call for her to make.
When Medea finally comes to commit the deed, however, Euripides presents her as 
being in an “akratic” condition (the second passage). Here is what Euripides has Medea 
say (1078-1080):
I know (μανθάνω) indeed what evil (κακόν) I intend to do,
But stronger than all my afterthoughts (ßo-u>^e4^at a> is  my 
fury (θυμός),
6Fury that brings upon mortals the greatest evils (κακόν).!4
The point that I wish to make about these two passages is that, when taken 
together, they reveal a philosophical complication which is deserving of more attention 
than it typically receives. The complication I have in mind is not so easily seen when it 
occurs in the context of a philosophical work of the complexity and richness of Aristotle’s 
Ethics. On the other hand, it is relatively easy to see in the Medea, and it is largely for this 
reason that I include the Medea passages in my discussion (besides their providing a 
wonderfully convenient way in which to help explain the Socratic view to which I take 
Aristotle to be responding). I elucidate the complication from the Medea in the following 
paragraphs before showing how it shows up in the Ethics.
If Medea’s changes of mind in the earlier passage (a mere dozen lines prior to the 
later passage) are really only reconsiderations (or even recalculations) of the advantages 
and disadvantages to come from the alternatives of killing the children and not killing the 
children, then we have ready to hand a perfectly good explanation for why she ultimately 
kills them, namely, that she miscalculates, or misjudges, or wrongly estimates (or 
commits some other sort of intellectual error), that this action is better for her overall 
than is the action of not killing them. She chooses the wrong alternative, after all, and 
the first passage leads us to believe that what will determine her choice is simply what 
results from a comparison of the relative advantages and disadvantages of each 
alternative. From the point of view of the first passage, and not anticipating the second, 
how else can she have failed to choose correctly but for her simply not knowing which 
alternative is the best one (though indeed she takes that course of action which, in the 
end, seems best to her)? According to the “akratic” explanation offered in the second 
passage, on the other hand, Medea is indeed not ignorant of what is best, for she knows 
which alternative this is, namely, not killing the children. Moreover, we are told in this 
passage, it is her fuxy (thumos) which gets her to act in spite of her knowing which of the 
two alternatives yields a better outcome.15 According to this explanation, there is no 
thoroughness or precision of calculation concerning the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of the alternatives, that will have been sufficient to prevent her from 
killing the children.
Most readers will recognize that the explanation of Medea’s action inspired by the 
first passage recalls Socrates’ denial that akrasia ever occurs. According to Socrates, 
knowledge cannot be overcome by passion or pleasure (Protagoras, 352b-357b), so if one 
knows which of one’s available alternatives is the best course of action to take, then one 
must act accordingly, unless otherwise prevented from so acting. All wrong action (that 
is, any action which yields less good or greater harm to the person than does some 
available alternative that was open to the person at the time of acting) is to be explained 
by the person’s Ignorance, or false belief; of what action from among· the alternatives was 
in fact best for him or her in that circumstance.16 I shall henceforward refer to this sort of 
explanation of wrong action as the “Socratic explanation.” According to this explanation 
of her action, Medea kills the children because she (wrongly) believes that this action is 
better for herself overall than the alternative; and wanting to do whatever’s best for 
herself given her circumstance, she acts according to this (false) belief.
I come now to the complication that have I mentioned. The person who demands 
some measure of philosophical acumen from his or her fiction should expect, having now 
read the first passage, that the explanation for why Medea kills the children is that she 
simply misjudges that the alternative of not killing the children xsl less beneficial for 
herself overall. (So we might imagine a Socratically inspired Euripides having Medea
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come to the terrible realization-after having acted-that she indeed misjudged the relative 
merits of her action. This certainly seems tragic enough.) But one should then find the 
appearance of the second, akrasia, passage a little puzzling because it is now superfluous: 
We simply do not need to appeal to akrasia in order to explain her action. In fact, the 
akratic explanation is plainly inconsistent with the Socratic one: if the state of her mind as 
she kills the children is one of ignorance or false belief about what’s best, she simply 
cannot be acting akratically. How, then, are we to come to grips with Medea’s action? Is 
she merely indecisive (unsure about what’s best for her to do in her circumstance), or 
akratic (knows what’s best, has that option open to her to perform, but does not do it)?
. My purpose in setting out these considerations-far from being an attempt to 
examine Euripides’ own account of human action (as though his chief concern in the 
Medea was to present such an account)-is to focus attention upon the juxtaposition of the 
Socratic and akratic accounts of human action that his literary example provides.
What I shall now maintain is that, provided that we accept a rather common 
construal of the text, we meet with the same sort of awkward juxtaposition in a rather 
unexpected place, namely, in Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia in the Nicomackean Ethics 
(VH.3,1147a31-35)! This is an unexpected place to find the juxtaposition, if I am right to 
say that it is there, quite aside from the consideration that this is now Aristotle we are 
talking about and not Euripides. (Although Euripides is very probably not interested in 
providing a coherent account of some wrong actions in the Medea, Aristotle surely is in 
VII.3 of the Ethics; and whatever his philosophical merits may have been, if any, 
Euripides was no Aristotle.) The real surprise is that, because Aristotle is partly 
concerned, as we have seen, to answer Socrates’ rejection of akrasia with a positive 
account of akrasia, he should have been particularly wary to avoid a juxtaposition of 
explanations similar to that found in the Medeal For then, much like Euripides, Aristotle 
will have superfluously juxtaposed an akratic account of wrong action with an 
explanation of wrong action that is perfectly Socratic-Socratic, that is, in the sense that 
the wrong action may be explained quite satisfactorily as being solely the result of a (mis-) 
calculation about what’s best for the person in the present circumstance. If I am right 
about this, then the Socratic may him or her self reply to Aristotle’s apparent account of 
akrasia by simply redescribing Aristotelian so-called-akratic action in terms of false belief 
or ignorance. That is, just as Socrates might have said to his contemporary Euripides: 
“Well, Medea may believe that she is behaving akratically (at 1078- 
80), but as her indecisiveness in the first passage shows, she has 
really only—tragically-m iscalculated. This is all the explanation 
that is really needed for her action, and your including this first 
passage in your play only shows that you yourself are tempted by 
my own view that all of our actions are preceded by a consideration 
of their relative merits" and demerits—by a consideration of how  
good or bad they will turn out to be for us—and that all of our 
actions are brought about solely by such rational consideration.
Your addition of the akrasia passage is then really only ad hoc and 
unnecessary,”
the Socratic might likewise respond to Aristotle’s account of akrasia:
Aristotle is unable to refute Socrates’ denial of akrasia so long as 
his own positive account of akrasia has the akrates rationally 
calculating about the merits and demerits of his or her wrong 
action. For then, we may justifiably press Aristotle for an 
explanation of how, or why, the wrong action must result from 
akrasia rather than ignorance. In fact, the Socratic may well press 
Aristotle for an explanation of what, precisely, the difference
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between ignorance and akrasia is really supposed to be. (Is this 
one more instance in which "being overcome by pleasure” turns out 
to be nothing other than ignorance? [Prig. 357c-d.]
As I shall argue below, the only sure way for Aristotle to effectively respond to 
Socrates’ denial of akrasia is by somehow or other blocking any redescription of the 
wrong-doer’s action in Socratically rational terms. What I will call a “Euripidean 
juxtaposition” of explanations, though, does not allow him to do this. If I am right, then 
not only does Aristotle fail to refute Socrates’ seemingly outrageous denial of akrasia (a 
shocking enough result, I should think, from the point of view of many contemporary 
philosophical views about wrong action according to which Socrates is obviously wrong), 
but one is also then tempted to say that Aristotle “should have known better” how not to 
argue against his own near-contemporary. Neither consequence speaks well of Aristotle’s 
philosophical efforts in VII.1-3 of the Ethics.
This, as I say, is what happens i f  what I  have said is a common construal of 
Aristotle is correct. But what I shall argue for in the remainder of this paper is that this 
common construal is incorrect, and that, from Aristotle’s point of view, he has blocked any 
chance for a Socratic rational redescription of the wrong-doer’s action.17 The reason I 
think that, from his point of view, Aristotle has blocked the redescription of the wrong­
doer’s action, is because Aristotelian akratic action is not rational at all. It is not the 
result of any sort of intellectual calculation about what to do, nor about how to do it. This 
is the main thesis that I plan to elucidate and to defend.
But how, precisely, does the alleged Euripidean juxtaposition of explanations show 
up in the VII.3 passage (1147a31-35, reproduced below) in the first place? And even if it 
does, how, precisely, does its presence allow Socrates to “redescribe” what Aristotle wants 
to be akratic action as being an action done merely from ignorance or false belief? I shall 
begin to answer the first question in the remainder of the present section, reserving for 
the sequel my answer to the second question and the conclusion of my answer to the first.
How, then, does the alleged Euripidean juxtaposition of explanations show up in 
the Ethics passage? My answer here will require that I first introduce what has become 
something of a technical term in Aristotelian scholarship, namely, the “practical 
syllogism”—not Aristotle’s own term. Considerations of space will not permit a more full 
discussion of this controversial subject than what I provide below.
According to the construal of Aristotle that I am contrasting with my own position, 
we are to suppose that the Aristotelian akrates possesses two practical syllogisms at the 
time that he or she behaves akratically, each of the syllogisms recommending to the 
akrates two distinct courses of action, namely, to avoid the bad action and to pursue the 
bad action. The practical syllogism seems to be Aristotle’s way-at least sometimes--of 
representing a.person’s thinking about what to do in a particular circumstance and,then, 
acting-more specifically, of a person’s going from a somewhat general belief (or 
“universal” belief, or premise) about what to do, to doing a quite particular action- The 
person does this by way of “combining” (1147a26-7) this universal belief with a particular 
belief (DA, III.11.434al7-19, EN, VII.3.1147ae, 4, 25; 1147bl3, 15). For example: If John 
Dough has the universal belief that Everything sweet must be tasted (1147a29-31), 
practical syllogistic gets him to actually taste the particular (sweet) fresh pastry which sits 
before him by his combining the universal belief that Everything sweet must be tasted 
with the particular belief that This [the particular pastry] is sweet. Unless otherwise 
prevented CEN,1147a31; cf., DMA, 1SIOlal 5-16). the combination .of the two behefs results 
in a conclusion which is itself an action (DMA, 701al3,20,23; hence, a practical syllogism, 
as opposed to a “syllogism of reason,” DMA, 701a7-13; EN, 1147a25-28).18
A4
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Now how does the person go from the universal belief to performing the action? 
The answer that is suggested by the sweetness example (see also the examples 
mentioned in note 17), it seems to me, is that the person comes to “substitute,” as it were, 
the particular object mentioned in the particular belief (a particular pastry, say) for the 
sort of object that is mentioned in the universal belief, so that what the person thinks 
about the sort of object (of sweets, that they must be tasted), he or she now also comes to 
think about the quite particular object (of this [fresh pastry], that it must be tasted), and 
this substitution results in the action (e.g., the action of tasting the fresh pastiy). In sum, 
the person has the belief that, 1. Everything sweet must be tasted, and the belief that, 
2. This [pastry] is sweet. By substituting the term ‘this’ (the particular pastry) in (2) 
for the term ‘everything sweet’ in (1), the person comes to eat the fresh pastry sitting 
before him or her, since, after all, he now also believes that, This must be tasted.
' Now my elucidating the practical syllogism in terms of such a rational 
“substitution” is justified by Aristotle’s own mention of the “combination” of universal and 
particular beliefs (1147a26-7) which he maintains causes (at least some) action. Action 
occurs, he says, when “όταν δέ μία γένηται έξ αύτων,” or, ‘when one [belief] comes from 
these [universal and particular beliefs].’ I fail to see what sense Aristotle’s remark could 
have in the present context (comparing, as he does, the practical syllogism with the 
“theoretical” Syllogism, where substitution must take place) if not his making some point 
about what I have called “substitution” in the above illustration.
Moreover, it seems to me, such a combination of beliefs will also demand of Dough 
(just as it does of Medea) that he “calculate,” in some sense, about the merits and demerits 
of the particular alternatives before him -in other words, tha t he intellectually 
discriminate between pastry, pastiy box, pastry tissue, etc. This may strike some readers 
as remarkably counterintuitive, for it may seem that we know the identity of such things 
“automatically,” as it were. For the time being, my answer here is simply to underscore 
that the aim of what I have called “substitution” is to produce an action that satisfies an 
only somewhat general desire, for the aim of the present syllogism is to produce an action 
that is sweet-pursuing. But without discriminating between his various altem atives- 
without checking for, hypothesizing about or guessing at (and the like) the proposed 
object’s suitability for being acted upon given the parameters specified in the universal 
belief-how can this aim be met? To say that This is sweet is, for purposes of the 
syllogism, to “rank” this ahead of other things for its relevance to the universal belief 
(1112al7-19) and to do that will require some discriminatory ability. Eating the box in 
which the pastries sit, after all, will hardly do to satisfy the appetite for sweet; making for 
a sweet demands a “surgically” precise mechanism of object selection. My overall point 
here is that rational substitution requires rational discrimination.
So whenever Dough satisfies a desire by, in part, the use of practical syllogistic* his 
rational faculty must determine how to act to satisfy the desire. He must combine beliefs 
about objects and actions that are of differing degrees of specificity, and for that purpose, 
some objects and actions will do, others will not, and some will do better than others.
Importantly, I think, Aristotle’s remark about combination immediately precedes 
his “Everything sweet must be tasted” example, which itself immediately precedes the 
passage which I claim contains the alleged Euripidean juxtaposition of Socratic and 
akratic explanations. Quite evidently, then, whatever else may be true about it, “practical 
syllogistic” will play some role in Aristotle’s account of akrasia, and so, no less, will the 
notion of combination. Furthermorersmce the sort of substitutionB-oBseombanation-and^ 
discrimination that I have been discussing is a rational principle (or principles), and
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provided that my account of Aristotelian practical syllogistic has not been in error, then I 
conclude that Aristotle’s explanation of akrasia at 1147a31-35 must include the akrates’ 
use of this rational principle.
For the time being, then, so much for the practical syllogism. Here, now, is what 
Aristotle says at EN, 1147a31-35, the passage which I claim includes an Euripidean 
juxtaposition of explanations, if interpreted as mentioning two practical syllogisms:
« Suppose, then, that someone has (a) the universal belief, and it 
hinders him from tasting; he has (b) the second belief, that 
__ everything sweet is pleasant and this is sweet, and this belief (b) is 
32-3 active; and he also has appetite {epithumia}. Hence, the belief (c) 
i tells him to avoid this, but appetite leads him on, since it is capable 
34-5 I of moving each of the [bodily] parts.
Now there is a certain vagueness in this passage which might easily lead one to 
believe that there are mentioned not one, but two, practical syllogisms, each 
recommending a quite distinct, and contrary, action. In lines 31-2, Aristotle clearly refers 
to there being a universal belief which recommends against tasting; and in lines 32-3, 
there seems to be mention of another universal belief —that Everything sweet is pleasant- 
-a belief which, from the point of view of appetite, can only be a recommendation to taste 
something sweet. Once it is assumed that there is but one universal belief per practical 
syllogism,19 and once it is seen that the two universal statements have contrary aims, then 
what seems to emerge from the passage is that there are indeed two practical syllogisms 
being mentioned. The first says something like this (the phrase in brackets indicates the 
action that is taken, or is to be taken):
The Good Syllogism 
Nothing sweet is to be tasted.20 
This is sweet.
[Avoid this.]
The second says something like this:
The Syllogism of Appetite
Everything sweet is pleasant (and so is to be tasted).21 
This is sweet.
[Taste this.]
We then have the remark at lines 34-5 that it is appetite (επιθυμία) which moves the 
akrates to act wrongly. Thus we have some very strong textual evidence that appetite 
gets the person to act upon some particular object via its own practical syllogism, the 
Syllogism of Appetite, and that it does so contrary to the recommendation of the Good 
Syllogism.
Aristotelian akrasia, then, seems to occur in something like the following way? The 
akrates knows what’s best for him or her to do at the time of acting, having determined 
this (presumably among other considerations) through combining a universal belief with 
a particular belief, a belief about a quite particular object (or about an action, or the 
person’s self*2). Presumably, too, the person has a desire to act upon what is known to be 
best (βούλησις, or ‘wish’). The akrates therefore knows to avoid this thing (the fresh 
pastry), but he or she also has appetite (epithumia), and this desire gets him or her to 
make for the sweet thing in spite of what is known to be best. (Presumably, appetite does 
this when it is in some sense stronger than is the desire to do what is known to be best. 
Moreover, appetite alights upon the sweet thing (the particular pastry) via its own 
practical Syllogism, a mechanism which enables appetite to* pick out the* sweet thing, as, 
something that it would be pleasant to eat.
I do not say that all who think that Aristotle’s account involves two practical 
syllogisms will agree with me as to each of the details of the picture that I have sketched 
here. I say only that it is somewhat common to find interpretations of Aristotle which 
have him explaining akrasia in part by reference to two practical syllogisms.23
But now if, as I have argued above, the practical syllogism is a rational mechanism 
of action selection, involving, as it does, substitution of terms in an effort to combine two 
beliefs into one for the purpose of action, as well as a discrimination between alternative 
courses of action for determining what object and action is suitable for such a 
combination, then, I maintain, we have a situation much like Medea’s from the first 
passage. For then the akrates must be rationally calculative about the particular fresh 
pastry in such a way that strongly suggests that his or her two-syllogistic state of soul is in 
fact a state of indecision. On the one hand. Dough realizes (as is evidenced by the Good 
Syllogism), that the pastry is unhealthy for him (or carries some other disadvantage)-a 
reason against eating; on the other hand, he also realizes (as is evidenced by the Syllogism 
of Appetite) that it is pleasant tasting-a reason for eating. Each of these conclusions is 
reached via the same rational faculty, and so we have no good reason so far to suppose 
that his eventual consumption of the pastry may be attributed to akrasia, for-again, so 
far—we only have reason to attribute it to his indecisiveness regarding the pastry. “Is the 
experience of the pleasant taste worth the sacrifice to my health,” Dough might ask 
himself, “Or is the retention of health worth passing on the pastry?” Isn’t this state one of 
trying to determine what action will be best for Dough overall? But it will be recalled 
that, at least according to the two-syllogisms construal of Aristotle, the presence of each 
of these syllogisms in the akrates1 soul is supposed to play a central role in his 
explanation of akratic action ! If so, then it seems to me that we have a Euripidean 
juxtaposition of explanations in the Ethics.
As I have cautioned earlier, the above discussion is only the beginning of my 
answer to the question, “How, precisely, does the Euripidean juxtaposition of explanations 
show up in the Ethics.” Without doubt, many readers will be somewhat dissatisfied with 
what I have said on this score so far. Among other things, it may be thought, there is a big 
difference between the sort of “indecision” experienced by Dough and that experienced by 
Medea. To begin with, Medea’s calculations (if that’s what they are) involve a far more 
sophisticated deliberation than does Dough’s rational determination (if that’s what it is) 
that this is a pastry, and his fairly uncomplicated combination of universal and particular 
beliefs. In fact, my presentation of the practical syllogism—even if my admitted lack of 
thoroughness about it is allowed to pass-seems rather suspect on at least this one crucial 
point, viz., on the m atter of whether or not the person actually intellectually 
discriminates between various objects in order to select the one that the person believes 
is compatible with the universal belief. It may seem far too implausible to suppose that 
Dough actually has to think to himself that this is the pastry (and not that, the pastry 
box)," before eating it. To the contrary, it seems that no sort of rational discrimination is 
needed for such matters. Even if Dough needs to use some sort of reasoning to decide that 
he wanted pastries, as well as for figuring out how to go to the store to get them (and the 
like), when it comes down to actually picking up the pastry for eating, such an action is 
much more “automatic” and non-intellectual.
Besides, as the two-syllogisms account will have it. Dough’s distinct conclusions 
regarding the pastry are apparently “managed” by two distinct desires, one a desire for 
the good (assuming here that the Good Syllogism’s universal premise is influenced; say, ~ 
by a concern for health because health is a good thing for the one who is healthy), and the
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other a desire for what’s merely bodily pleasant (regardless of whether or not the bodily 
pleasant is good). While it may have seemed that Medea’s contrary concerns had some 
prospect of being reconciled with one another (so that she can, in principle, make a 
rational decision about which alternative is the best for her overall), perhaps Dough’s 
contrary concerns are not reconcilable with one another—perhaps, that is, the two goods 
under consideration-the “real” good, and the bodily pleasant—are incommensurable 
goods, and so there is no prospect of their being reconciled with one another in any 
rational way.
Each of these ways in which Dough’s and Medea’s indecisiveness differ, it might be 
objected, renders my attempted comparison between them a doomed project. And come 
what may for the imagined Socratic response to Euripides, the analogy need not apply to 
Aristotle’s use of two syllogisms to explain akrasia.
I plan to answer these concerns, as well as some related ones, in the following 
section, where my primary task will be to answer the other main question mentioned 
earlier, viz., ‘How, precisely, does the presence of an (alleged) Euripidean juxtaposition of 
explanations in the Ethics allow Socrates to redescribe what Aristotle wants to be akratic 
action as being an action done merely from ignorance or false belief?’.
§4. A Socratic Response to the Alleged Two-Syllogisms Explanation of Akrasia.
I have said that by attributing to Aristotle the view that the akrates possesses two 
contrary practical syllogisms, we are attributing to him an account of akrasia which fails 
to close off the Socratic redescription of “akrasia” as being merely a state of ignorance. 
The reason that this is so is because, if the two-syllogisms construal really is part of 
Aristotle’s account of akrasia then, as I see it, the Socratic may respond as follows.
(1) The means by which the person carries out an Aristotelian 
practical syllogism is the very same means by which the person 
carries out Socratic rational calculation about whafs best to do in 
the present circumstance, namely, by intellectually deciding what 
particular action will best satisfy the desire that the person has 
(i.e., by “substitution” and discriminating between alternatives).24
So,
(2) The Aristotelian akrates, who acts according to a “syllogism of 
appetite,” must intellectually decide what particular action will 
best satisfy the appetite (to go ahead and eat this [pointing] sweet 
thing, it being the sort of thing that satisfies the desire for 
something sweet to taste). That is, the person must nevertheless 
intellectually “screen” the proposed (wrong) action in terms of its 
relative advantage to the person’s appetite.
The Socratic may then make the following breathtaking, if suspicious-looking, move:
(3) Therefore, if, in addition to the good syllogism, there is  also the 
syllogism of appetite, then, when the Aristotelian akrates acts he or 
she is acting from a (false) belief about what is best overall for him 
or her in the present circumstance!
So-provided that (3) is allowed-the Socratic may also insist that, therefore,
(4) The explanation for the Aristotelian “akrates’ ” wrong action is a 
false belief (ignorance) the person has about the goodness to be 
gotten by eating sweets.
If (4), then Aristotle has not refuted Socrates because the action may be redescribed in 
intellectualist terms. Thus we have it that, from the Socratic point of view, the 
Aristotelian “akrates’ ” action seems to be the result of a rational thought process, and 
that, as Socrates would have it, therefore his or her action is to be explained by reference
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to a miscalculation, or misjudgement or other sort of intellectual error regarding the 
proposed action’s overall goodness; and we see why the Socratic might say that Aristotle 
simply does not need to appeal to an irrational desire (epithumia) in order to explain the 
wrong action any more than fury (thumos) is needed to explain Medea’s wrong action.
But as my discussion above suggests, (3) seems to be a questionable move. In fact, 
(3) may seem to be a very sloppy piece of thinking on the part of the Socratic, for it simply 
does not follow from the fact that the person is reasoning about how to best satisfy his or 
her desire for something that is bodily pleasant that he or she is therefore reasoning 
about how to best satisfy his or her desire for whatever*s best for him or her in the present 
circumstance. For what it is that one desires in the one case (what’s best) is not (except 
fortuitously) the same thing as what it is that one desires in the other case (what’s merely 
bodily pleasant). Quite simply, it may be pleasant to eat sweets, but, generally speaking, 
sweets are not good for a person. Hence, to reason about how to satisfy the one desire is 
not (except fortuitously) to reason about how to satisfy the other desire. The Socratic may 
not maintain that, because the akrates* action is the result of some rational thought 
process, therefore the wrong action is to be explained by reference to some intellectual 
miscalculation. So the Socratic will be quite wrong to maintain (in [4]) that the person is 
acting upon a false belief about what’s best overall for him or her to do, for that person 
may be a genuine akrates. The Aristotelian akrates, in that case, has a true belief about 
what’s best for him or her right now (but does not act upon that belief), but instead acts 
upon a belief about what’s merely bodily pleasant-and, in fact, this belief might also be a 
true belief.
My answer to this objection is as follows. The objection’s force, I think, derives 
from the assumption that,
(5) The person doesn’t need to be desiring the good in order to use 
his or her rational faculty to act upon the desire that he or she has 
since he or she could be knowingly desiring some other thing.25 
This assumption is what allows the objector to grant what I have said about Aristotelian 
practical syllogistic (that it involves substitution and discrimination), but think very little 
of the concession: granting that even appetite needs to do some amount of reasoning in 
order to figure out what particular thing to act upon is not damaging to a two-syllogisms 
interpretation of Aristotle, because the reasoning that goes on here is simply reasoning 
about how to satisfy what appetite wants, and that is not (except fortuitously) reasoning 
about whats best.
My strategy for answering the objection to (3) will be to disarm the force of the 
assumption (5). And I will do this by arguing that, since Socrates does not himself make 
the assumption (5), and since, as I have already argued, Aristotle’s account of akrasia in 
the Ethics, is designed, in considerable, part, to answer Socrates’ rejection of akrasia, 
Aristotle himself cannot accept (5) as an assumption, but must make some sort of 
argument on its behalf. . .  if, indeed, he wishes to rely upon (5) at all. However, since I 
expect that Aristotle would find arguing for (5), against the Socratic, an extremely difficult 
task (and perhaps even contrary to some of his own views about rational desire for the 
good), he himself would not argue for (5)!26 To see why this is so, it will be necessary to 
consider some aspects of the Socratic psychology of action in some detail.
While Socrates’ view is typically regarded with easy-going skepticism, and while it 
may be tempting for some to say of Medea, “How could she not know that it’s wrong to kill 
the children?”27 his view nevertheless suggests a rather elegant way of relating thought, 
desire and action with one another that cannot be matched by the akratic explanation. 
According to this suggestion, all human action is rational action in the sense of its being
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the direct result of an intellectual calculation about what’s best for the person to do in his 
or her present circumstance—that is, all human action is the result of a rational desire. In 
what follows I elaborate on this point.
A Socratic explanation of action draws together thought and desire by maintaining 
the following:
(6) All action results from the comparative strength of the desire to 
perform that action over the strength of the desire to perform an 
alternative action.*8
(7) The strength of a desire is directly related to the degree of good 
(pleasure) or bad (pain) that the person expects to come from the 
action: the greater is the degree of good, or the lesser is the degree 
of bad, expected to come from the action, the stronger is the desire 
to perform that action.29
(8) The expectation of goodness upon which a person acts is formed 
solely by his or her intellectual calculations about the relative 
pleasures and pains to come from the action, i.e., all expectation of 
goodness is rational expectation.30
So we get that,
(9) The person always acts on that alternative which he or she 
rationally expects will bring the most good.
Propositions (6-9) all lie behind the Socratic position that all action proceeds from a 
rational desire, or a desire for what’s best for the person in the present circumstance.31 If 
the person’s conception of a proposed action changes in light of new information or fresh 
considerations (e.g., Medea now believes that getting revenge against Jason leads to her 
own misery, or she now believes that she will be even more miserable if she fads to kill 
the children, or she now believes that the children may be a source of cheer to her, and so 
on), then the strength of his or her desire to perform that action changes, and he or she 
will instead take an alternative course of action (provided that the desire to perform that 
alternative is now the strongest); and, conversely, if the person’s desire to perform a 
particular action changes, then his or her conception of the goodness of the action in 
comparison with the alternatives must have changed.
If this account of the relation between desire, thought and action is correct, then 
not only do we have a tidy explanation of why Medea vacillates back and forth between 
alternatives (fresh considerations present themselves to her as she contemplates her 
action, resulting in her changes of mind about which alternative is best), but we also get a 
Socratic (if not Socrates’) reason for denying the possibility of akrasia:
(10) All wrong action-that is, all actions which yield less good (or 
more bad) for the person than some available alternative action- 
must be solely the result of some sort of miscalculation, of which 
alternative is really the best one for the person.32
Without a doubt, Socrates will have been attracted to the first passage from the Medea 
because of the account of Medea’s immanent wrong action that it suggests, but then find 
himself somewhat befuddled by the second, akratic passage. But if akrasia explains 
Medea’s action, then her thought about her situation and the strength of the desire upon 
which she acts have, as it were, come unstuck-if ever they were connected. Her desire to 
kill the children must then vaiy independently (or, at least, somewhat independently) of 
her beliefs about whether or not she will be able to live happily (or less miserably) after 
having killed them -an astonishing psychological state of affairs from the Socratic point of 
view. If some human actions are akratic, then the relationship between thought, desire
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and action must inevitably be a far more complicated affair than the Socratic explanation 
makes it out to be.
However, with these Socratic presumptions (6-9) in place, let’s see what happens 
when it is allowed that Dough’s rational facility is quite capable of determining for him 
that this is to be tasted, and not that, if his epithumia is to be satisfied. In other words, 
let’s allow that the epithumia mentioned in fine 33 of 1147a have its own practical 
syllogism. The case that I wish to make on behalf of the Socratic here can be made clear 
if we imagine the Socratic cross-examining the akrates about why he acted as he did, and 
the akrates responding according to the information contained in his syllogism of appetite. 
Here, again, is the Syllogism of Appetite:
Everything sweet is pleasant (and so should be tasted).
This is sweet.
: [Taste this.]
If the Socratic now asks Dough, “Why did you taste the fresh pastry?” Dough’s answer is, 
“Because it is sweet.” While this response on Dough’s part is informative, the Socratic 
who is still presuming that (6-9), and hence (10), are true need not yet be compelled into 
believing that he is speaking with a genuine akrates. The very nature of the Socratic view 
of desire and action has it that the person pursues sweetness (say) because he or she 
thinks it the best of his or her present alternatives. So if the Socratic is to be convinced 
that he is dealing with a genuine akrates, he or she will continue to press the issue. We 
might imagine, then, the exchange continuing along the following lines: Socrates asks, “I 
still don’t quite follow you. Dough. What difference does its sweetness make as to whether 
or not it should be tasted?” Dough responds: “Well, everything sweet is pleasant, and 
pleasant things should be tasted.” This exchange between them now exhausts the 
information recorded in the Syllogism of Appetite. But, as before, the Socratic still need 
not be compelled by Dough’s response. All that Dough has done is to change the 
description of the object of his desire from the sweet to the pleasant, so Socrates still has 
no reason to suppose that Dough is pursuing the pleasant for any other reason than that 
it is thought to be the best of his present open alternatives. Suppose, then, that Socrates 
continues his questioning along the same lines as before. Socrates: “I’m starting to get a 
better picture, Dough, as to why you tasted the fresh pastry. But I’m still a little foggy 
about your explanation. Why should pleasant things be tasted?” How, now, is Dough to 
answer? Some scholars have said that, as a simple matter of fact, the akrates is simply 
unable to justify him or her self any further. Typically, this view is presented as one 
about how Aristotle’s conception of the appetitive practical syllogism simply works. Once 
the universal premise is reached, the akrates is simply not able to justify his or her action 
any farther.33 I find such a position on the matter uncompelling. To begin with, it begs 
the crucial question: Why can’t the person answer any further?—what non-intellectual > 
factor prevents the akrates from answering? In fact, when it is borne in mind that the 
account of akrasia in question is aimed mostly at Socrates, such a response amounts to 
little more than a refusal to do philosophy with Socrates since it seems only to declare the 
question unanswerable by the akrates', and since it is reasonably clear that Aristotle 
wishes to engage the Socratic philosophically, this seems to be an unflattering 
interpretation of Aristotle’s account of akrasia. Moreover, the Socratic will be eager to 
point out, the would-be akrates was perfectly able in his or her answering of questions up 
to this point, so there is nothing wrong with his or her rational faculty. That is, Dough 
gives evidence of having substituted this particular pastry for. sweets', amhpresumably, 
sweets has been substituted for the pleasant tasting. So Dough has also done some sort of
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discriminating between alternatives to arrive at the beliefs that Sweets are pleasant 
tasting and that This is sweet. Are we to simply suppose, then, that Dough’s rational 
abilities suddenly atrophy once the universal belief is reached? No, the Socratic need not 
be compelled here--at least not without further argumentation. In fact, if Aristotle 
thought this maneuver a sufficient means with which to deal with Socrates, then I can’t 
see that he has much reason to treat Socrates’ rejection of akrasia as the source of the first 
aporia for the common beliefs. Why use Socrates’ view as something of a test for the 
viability of the common beliefs if, in the end, it is sufficient to merely declare that the 
rational faculty upon which the Socratic view depends is ineffective at some apparently 
arbitrary point in the akrates’ reasoning process? (Similarly, it should now be seen, the 
Socratic will not be immediately put off by the view that some goods are simply 
incommensurable with one another without much more argument on behalf of the 
incommensurabilist. How, Socrates might ask, are we to be sure that the state of mind 
the person is in is best described as being pulled in two different directions by 
incommensurable goods, rather than as mere ignorance [uncertainty, etc.] about how the 
goods are to be rationally compared with one another?)34
Now, there are two answers to Socrates’ last question (“Why should pleasant 
things be tasted?”) that Dough must not give to Socrates, namely,
(DE) "I don’t know why, or whether, pleasant things should be 
tasted,”
and,
(PG) "Because what’s pleasant is what’s good (best for me in the 
present circumstance).”
Dough must not Say (DK) because this may give Socrates just what he wants: a confession 
of ignorance or uncertainty about the proposed action.
He must not say (PG) because this will only show that Dough wrongly thinks that 
the pleasant is the good, and once more exhibits his ignorance about what’s best for 
himself. In other words, (PG) simply transforms what was a syllogism of appetite into a 
“good” syllogism—a syllogism which represents the person trying to get what is best for 
him or her self. Then, the Socratic may well maintain that Aristotle’s passage on akrasia 
really is like Euripides’ first passage in the Medea: Dough sees two alternatives open 
before him, each with its share of goods (pleasures) and bads (pains), and determining 
which of the two courses of action is the most pleasurable may be somewhat difficult 
(resulting, perhaps, in a feeling of “inward struggle”); but, in any event. Dough is, like 
Medea, merely indecisive and not akratic.
Perhaps some readers will object that my way of handling the inadequacy of (PG) 
is a little facile for, after all, Aristotle may simply maintain that Dough’s thinking (PG) is 
a matter of habit because the person has, over time, come to (wrongly) identify the 
(bodily) pleasant with the good. If so, then of course Dough’s saying (PG) is not the result 
of ignorance so much as it is an acquired intellectual disability: His reasoning about 
matters of the bodily pleasant has become somewhat “corrupted”. But this suggestion 
will not do here. For the habit described--that of believing that the (bodily) pleasant is 
the good—is the state Aristotle calls akolasia (“intemperance”), and this state, he 
maintains, is quite distinct from akrasia. The akolastos decides to act on the bodily 
pleasant because the good is thought to be the bodily pleasant...  but the akrates does not 
have this belief (1148al7-18; see also 1148a8-9)! In other words, the akolastos 
(habitually) wrongly concludes that the bodily pleasant is the good, but the akrates draws 
no such conclusion·, the akrates decides (prohairesis) whafs best, but does not act upon it.
I conclude, then, that, as against the Socratic, Aristotle will have created a great
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deal of philosophical trouble for himself to explain akrasia by, in part, making reference 
to a second practical syllogism, this one in the charge of appetite. Similarly, then, I 
conclude also that Aristotle will have had a difficult time in using the assumption (5) to 
argue against Socrates (namely, that the person doesn’t need to be desiring the good in 
order to use his or her rational faculty to act upon the desire that he or she has). (In fact, 
I suppose that Aristotle will have agreed with Socrates that,
(5*) All practical reasoning is reasoning about satisfying a desire 
for the good.3*)
I am now in a position to answer an objection that I raised earlier concerning 
Socrates’ alleged fallacious identification of,
(P) reasoning about how to get what’s (merely bodily) pleasant for 
oneself,
with,
(B) reasoning about how to get what’s best for oneself,
or, the apparently fallacious (3): “If, in addition to the good syllogism, there is also the 
syllogism of appetite, then, when the Aristotelian akrates acts he or she is acting from a 
(false) belief about what is best overall for him or her in the present circumstance.”
Now surely, Socrates does not believe that what’s best for oneself ju st is 
whatever^ (merely bodily) pleasant for oneself, so my argument here will not proceed by 
way of defending Socrates in that way. Instead, I will begin by pointing out that, in the 
context of the argument in which (3) was originally stated, the Socratic him or her self 
says nothing about there being any desire for what’s merely bodily pleasant for the 
person-ίΛαί point being part of the objection against the Socratic’s argument. The 
Socratic3s point, made against the two-syllogisms approach, is only that,
(R) In reasoning about how to satisfy whatever desire it is that the 
person has, the person must reason about how to get what’s best for 
him or her self.
Then, of course, if we suppose, with the two-syllogisms account of akrasia, that,
(DP) Sometimes we desire to do only what’s bodily pleasant for us, 
regardless of whether or not getting what’s merely bodily pleasant 
is also good for us,
then, together with (R), we get the apparently implicit identification of (B) with (P). For 
then, whenever we reason about how to satisfy one of the desires mentioned in (DP), we 
must, by (R), be reasoning about how to get what’s best for ourselves. The point that I 
am making, however, is that while Socrates endorses (R), he does not, as is pretty widely 
agreed, endorse (DP).36 Of course, a discussion of all of the whys and wherefores of 
Socrates’ endorsement of (R) and rejection of (DP) falls well outside the scope of this 
paper. But, these matters taken as granted, we are in a position to see rather plainly why 
the Socratic will not allow there to be a syllogism of appetite without careful and rigorous 
argumentation on Aristotle’s part. Once it is granted that the syllogism of appetite 
involyes-in fact, requires--the rational substitution of a particular this for the sort of 
thing mentioned in the universal premise, the Socratic (who endorses [R] and is waiting 
for an argument against it) may well press the “akrates” Dough for an answer to the 
question about why the thing’s pleasantness is a reason for tasting. The person’s powers 
of rational substitution function perfectly well in the remainder of the practical syllogism 
(Dough’s explaining that the pastry’s sweetness is a reason for eating the pastry, and that 
a sweet taste’s being pleasant is a reason for pursuing the sweet), so why should they 
falter now? Is it because the sort of reasoning involved in justifying the universal premise 
is of a relevantly different sort than what I have been referring to as the “substitution of a 
particular thing for a somewhat general thing”? I fail to see how. From the Socratic point
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of view, after all (and that is the point of view that matters here), persons always want 
what’s really best for themselves, so the belief that something pleasant should be tasted 
must be the result of supposing (at least in the person’s present circumstance) that the 
pleasant-tasting is the good. But what this reasoning involves is simply a rational 
substitution of the term, the pleasant-tasting, for the term, whatever’s best (in the present 
circumstance)! But this is precisely what occurs, I have maintained, in Aristotelian 
practical syllogistic. In each case, the person must discriminate between his or her 
available options, decide which of them best fits the bill, and then perform the 
substitution of terms. This seems to be quite enough to make practical syllogistic a case of 
“Socratic” substitution. I expect that Socrates would have said here:
“It seems that this fresh pastry is really only thought-good by Dough; 
but this does not mean that he therefore doesn’t really desire only the 
real good. Dough’s problem is clearly a misestimation of the goodness 
to come from the action of eating the pastry, together with a 
misestimation of the good to come from the action of not eating the 
pastry. He is, like Medea in the first passage, only indecisive about 
what’s really best for himself. A two-syllogisms approach to giving a 
positive account of akrasia is wholly unsatisfactory as a refutation of 
my rejection of akrasia.”
To sum up this portion of my discussion: from the point of view of the philosophical 
exchange between Aristotle and Socrates on akrasia, there is nothing suspect, really, 
about the Socratic’s premise (3) in the argument against the two-syllogisms approach. So 
long as Dough is reasoning about how best to satisfy a desire (remember: Dough opts for 
the pastry, and not the box in which it sits), he is reasoning about how to do what’s best 
for himself--never mind what he says (cf. Medea’s declaration of akrasia in the second 
passage)!
Another objection that will be made regarding my presentation of the practical 
syllogism is that it simply does not involve reasoning, or at least, that it does not involve 
the relevant sort of reasoning needed in order for me to treat it as being the Socratic sort 
of rational mechanism that I have said it is. Instead, according to this view, the practical 
syllogism is simply that device which non-rationally connects a person’s actual reasoning 
about what to do with his or her action, via perception (or some other non-rational--that is, 
non-substitutive—mechanism). The strongest account of this view is, in my estimation, 
John Cooper’s (Reason and Human Good in Aristotle, Hackett, pp. 1-88).
What inspires Cooper’s view is Aristotle’s claim that all virtuous action is chosen 
(prokairetike?7). According to Cooper, this claim of Aristotle’s, if taken quite literally, 
implies that our “moral decisions” are all somewhat robustly thought out. In fact. Cooper 
objects, if this is what Aristotle is saying, then our “moral decisions are much more 
excogitated than in general they are” (p.7). But surely, we might insist, our judgments 
about what we should do are not all that consciously thought out-if they are really 
thought out at all. Consider the following (“non-moral”) example of “extreme 
excogitation” offered by Cooper (p. 26):
To see what I’m doing I need light; to get light I can turn on 
the electric bulb; to turn on the electric bulb I need to turn 
the switch to “on”; this is the switch—whereupon I decide to 
turn this to “on,” and do so at once. Thus deliberation when 
complete yields an action, decided on as the action of 
turning this (pointing), or eating this, and so on, an action 
described in such terms, being always calculated as the,, or a, , 
way of realizing one’s purpose.38 




But Cooper maintains instead that once it is decided that turning on a light is a way 
of achieving one’s end (or, say, that eating sweets is a way of achieving one’s end), the 
agent need do no further rational discriminating between possible objects of action. The 
person doesn’t need to deliberate about what thing is the light switch (or the pastry), for 
he or she already knows this-he just reaches out and turns the switch to “on.” So when it 
comes to actually turning the switch, Cooper argues (p. 27) “It is perception that is called 
for . . . not further reflection.” It is not surprising, then, Cooper thinks, that Aristotle 
should characterize the particular premise of a practical syllogism as being “controlled 
by” perception (VII.3.1147a27, blO). Perhaps action is really only relatively prohairetike.
The main difficulty with Cooper’s argument about over-excogitation, or so I shall 
maintain, is that it fails to adequately explain how the person, non-rationally, actually 
mariages to turn the individual switch to ‘on,’ rather than perform some other action which 
does not have the effect of satisfying his desire for light. Let us assume that the person 
has now reached what we have been referring to as the universal premise in a practical 
syllogism (that, say, In all these sorts of circumstances, it is good to have light)—that point 
which Cooper thinks is the last thing that is deliberated, and which constitutes the 
prohairesis. How, precisely, are we to now explain the person’s actually reaching for and 
turning on the light switch? Cooper’s answer here is that the person need only perceive 
the light switch. But surely the person has a number of other perceptions at the same 
time as he or she perceives the light switch (e.g., perceptions of a faucet knob and a 
garbage disposal switch). So we may now ask (in perfectly Socratic fashion, I think) how 
does the person know upon which perception to act if, as Cooper has it, there is no rational 
means needed to perform the discrimination between perceptions (two perceptions of 
which, by the way, are frustratingly similar to one another)? How is our person to ensure 
that his or her dumb, non-rational perception of light switch rather than his or her 
perception of garbage disposal switch, or even faucet knob, “connects” with the universal 
belief about its being good to have light? If Dough perceives the pastry box in addition to 
the fresh pastries, how is it that these non-rational perceptions manage, by themselves, to 
have only the one and not the other of them connect with the universal belief in order to 
cause the action which leads to the satisfaction of the desire for sweet? I do not see how 
this can be,39 but for some discriminatory mechanism which is able to select the one as 
being the correct, or the better, perception upon which to act. Cooper thinks the question 
is one of whether or not one might already know what a light switch is or looks like (as 
though one perceives light switches in isolation from anything else), prior to turning it on.
I think this question is mostly beside the point, for the issue involved is one of how the 
person identifies which of his or her perceptions is the light switch perception-the 
perception needed in order to satisfy the desire for light.
I suggest, instead, that there must-even in these cases of seemingly “automatic” 
actiofi—be at work some sort of substitution principle which allows the person to 
discriminate between his or her various perceptions, so as to be able to pick out which 
perception (or perceptions) is (or so the person believes) relevant to the universal belief. 
On my view, when I act upon a light switch perception, I have discriminated between it 
and my other perceptions. The ideal candidate for such a principle is precisely some sort 
of Socratically rational principle, for what is needed is some means of determining that 
action upon this particular object is what the universal premise of the syllogism is calling 
for: The person does not turn the switch tu^oh simply for the su^e of turmng the switch to 
‘on,’ after all, but does so in order to achieve a certain end.
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Another way to look at my objection to Cooper’s view is invited by his suggestion 
that complete deliberation may take place well before any practical syllogism links it to 
action. If he is right, then it seems that the agent may “store up” several standing 
prohaireseis, each waiting to be acted upon when its appropriate perception takes place. 
By now, though, it should be clear that the person will require the services of some 
rational principle in order to successfully discharge any one of his or her standing 
prohaireseis. If not, how else will the right individual perception get hooked up with its 
corresponding prohairesis (again, conceived of here in the manner of a universal 
premise)? If it does not correctly get hooked up, I suggest, the reason is simply because 
the person has made some sort of error in his or her judgement about what’s best in  the 
present circumstance-about what perception goes with what “prohairesis.” (We may 
imagine here the prospective home buyer testing the light switches, but rather than 
turning on the kitchen light instead activates the garbage disposal. If Cooper’s position is 
correct, I see no reason why this person won’t simply make the same mistake over and 
over again: In all such situations as these which require a major economic commitment, 
test the product carefully, including a testing of the circuitry by turning on a light switch, 
says his “prohairesisH ere's a light switch, says non-rational perception; the person 
[repeatedly] turns on the garbage disposal just so long as it is the garbage disposal switch 
which is repeatedly perceived.)
When it is recalled, now, that Aristotle’s aim in VII.3 is, in part, to respond to 
Socrates with a positive account of akrasia, and it is also recalled that a Euripidean 
juxtaposition of explanations of wrong action allows the Socratic a far too ready reply to 
him -”Bzii the person is still acting from a rational desirer~vre should be highly dubious 
of an interpretation of Aristotle that has him explaining akrasia by making use of two 
practical syllogisms. A more promising reply to Socrates would be one in which akratic 
action is not rational at all (in the sense of involving substitution). I believe the relevant 
passages of the Ethics allows for such an alternative interpretation of Aristotle.
§5. Concluding Remarks.
There are at least two veiy pressing questions I have yet to answer, each of which 
must be left unattended. First: If Aristotle does not explain akrasia by the use of two 
practical syllogisms, then how else is the passage at 1147a31-5 (which seems to make 
such clear mention of two universal premises) to be read? Second: How does Aristotle’s 
account of akrasia really go? Below I offer only my own quick answers to each question, 
foregoing here arguments and explanations for either of them.
Aristotle’s account of akrasia, I believe, must rely upon epithumia being much like 
Plato’s species of irrational desire (Republic, IV, 435b, ff.) of the same name, which is 
“housed” in its own part of the soul--cut off from any use of a rational faculty to get itself 
acted upon. So Aristotle (and Plato) must provide a non-rational mechanism which gets 
the person to act upon the epithumia. As I stated at the outset: For Aristotle, akratic 
action is not rational at all (in the sense of involving substitution).
As for how to read the main passage discussed here (EN, 1147a31-35), I believe 
that a more thorough examination of Aristotelian practical syllogistic will show the 
troubling remark, “Everything sweet is pleasant and this is sweet,” to involve mention of 
only a particular premise-not a particular and (a second) universal. If so, then the 
textual evidence supporting a two-syllogisms account is considerably weakened.
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